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This study examines the relationships between female directors proxies by number of women 
sits on board, female directors expertise and independent female directors and capital 
structure of the 100 largest public listed companies in Malaysia based on market 
capitalization excluding the financial institutions. In addition, the study utilizes 2016 annual 
report. Results show approximately 16 percent of female sits on Malaysia board of directors. 
This study shows that there is still far from expected to achieve 30 percent in year 2017 as 
announcement of the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance in 2017. This study has 
founds positive significant relationships between firm size, tangibility and capital structure. 
The negative relationships on liquidity are significant, which have strongly influence the 
firm’s capital structure. Then, positive insignificant have been shown by the number of 
women sits on board, independent female directors, board size, and board composition. 
Furthermore, female directors expertise, firm age, and investment opportunities have negative 
insignificant relationship with the firm’s capital structure. The study also provides 
suggestions and recommendations for future research work. 
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Kajian ini mengkaji hubungan di antara proksi pengarah wanita melalui bilangan wanita yang 
menjadi pengarah, kepakaran pengarah wanita dan kebebasan pengarah wanita dan struktur 
modal bagi 100 syarikat terbesar yang tersenarai di Malaysia berdasarkan pasaran modal 
tidak termasuk institusi kewangan. Tambahan, kajian ini menggunakan laporan tahunan 
2016. Hasil kajian mendapati hampir 16 peratus pengarah perempuan berada dalam posisi 
pengarah di Malaysia. Kajian ini menunjukkan, masih jauh untuk mencapai 30 peratus bagi 
tahun 2017 seperti pengumuman Kod Tadbir Urus Korporat Malaysia pada tahun 2017. 
Kajian ini mendapati hubungan yang positif dan signifikan antara saiz syarikat, ketepatan dan 
struktur modal. Hubungan yang negatif  bagi kecairan syarikat adalah signifikan dan amat 
mempengaruhi struktur modal syarikat. Seterusnya, hubungan yang positif dan tidak 
signifikan bagi bilangan wanita yang menjadi pengarah, kebebasan pengarah wanita, saiz 
lembaga pengarah, dan komposisi lembaga pengarah. Selanjutnya, kepakaran pengarah 
wanita, umur syarikat, dan peluang pelaburan mempunyai hubungan yang negatif dan tidak 
signifikan dengan struktur modal syarikat. Kajian ini juga memberi cadangan bagi 
penyelidikan untuk masa hadapan. 
 
Kata Kunci: Pengarah Wanita, Struktur  Modal, Nisbah Hutang kepada Aset, Tadbir Urus 
Korporat 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
The gender diversity brings many benefits such as improving business performance, 
assessing the widest talent pool, bringing up more responsive to the markets and achieving 
good corporate governance. Gul et al. (2013) suggest that board diversity is adding 
transparency and accuracy to the financial statement reporting and earning management. 
Definitely, women participation in leadership will give a great impact on board function as 
well as firms performance. 
Global data at the United State (U.S) shows in less than one generation, women-owned firms 
(WOF’s) have achieved an unprecedented foothold in the U.S economy. National Association 
of Women Business Owners (NAWBO) stated that firms owned by women are more than 
11.6 million which are employing nearly 9 million people, and generating $1.7 trillion in 
sales as of 2017. Women-owned firms (51% or more), account for 39% for all privately held 
firms and contribute 8% of employment and 4.2% of revenue. In fact, one in five firms with 
revenue of $1 million or more is owned by women. 
Over the last decades, women have brought significant advance in workforce. Internationally, 
Norway was the starter by setting the quotas for the female involvement in board by 40 
percent in the year 2008, followed by Spain, Iceland and France with 40 percent, and 
Belgium, Italy and Netherlands with 30-33 percent (Ahern & Dittmar, 2012). Malaysia is no 
exception whereby the Department of Statistics Malaysia stated one of the five companies in 
Malaysia is owned by women.  
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As of August 2015, only 2% of S&P 500 companies had all male boards of directors, this 
marked an improvement from 2005, when only 12% of S&P companies had at least one 
female director on their board. All FTSE 100 firms have female directors. During 1997 until 
2009, S&P 1500 companies use acquisition bids and have found that every additional of the 
female director is related with 7.6% fewer bids and affected the premium paid by reducing it 
to 15%. 
In the context of Malaysia, June 2016, the effort to boost gender diversity in the top 100 
companies listed on Bursa Malaysia had reached a milestone when 15.2% of women director 
is appointed for the positioning wherein for the year 2018, only seven of the top 100 listed 
companied still do not have women on their board (The Star, 2018, January 22). These matter 
had becoming a serious issue since the former Prime Minister, Datuk Seri Najib Tun Razak 
has warned for those PLCs that did not have any women on their board directors would be a 
list to be published as “named and shamed” (The Star, 2018, January 22). The current 
campaign whereby the former Prime Minister wants to ensure that at least 30% presence of 
women on board of director for the listed companies to be made up by 2020 (The Star, 2018, 
January 22). This is an effort in promoting the benefit of gender diversity, inspiring debates 
and discussions, and also to give support for women to have more opportunity in executive 
and non-executive roles. 
In 2017, Noor Neelofa, a Malaysia actress and young successful entrepreneur who managed 
to brought up her name internationally, has been appointed as the Air Asia’s non-executive 
independent director. As we can see, women in leadership positions are still rare but the 
evidence shows that women are better at running a business (The Star, 2017, December 8). 
Progress in getting more women into work has been attributed to a number of factors 
including better education, wider job sectors which they seem to be friendlier, rise of micro 
enterprises and flexible work arrangement. Adding women to the workforce will boost labor 
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supply, overcome the downdraft from lower fertility and the declination of population 
growth. Moreover, women also want to be promoted and are equally concerned about their 
career trajectory and growth as their male counterparts. 
This gender of directors receive so much debate, both in the academic literature and in the 
popular press. An investigation showed that male directors that are beyond 55 years old due 
to the an absence of qualified female applicants as the primary purpose for the stagnant of 
number of female directors. Conversely, the investigation additionally demonstrated that 
more youthful male directors are considered for promotions compared to the female directors 
and this is one of explanations towards moderate in number. 
In contrast, the study also showed that female directors and younger male directors 
considered the male-dominated networking that often led to the appointment of directors to 
be the reason behind women’s slow progress. However, industries that have fewer female 
high status managers have a greater gender wage gap (Cohen & Huffman, 2007). Other than 
that, Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer (1999) found that women are less likely to take financial risks 
compared to men. Then, women business owners (WBOs) stated that self-perceived risk 
serves as another powerful barrier to an efficient financing. Thus, firms with women 
participation tend to have low debt financing compared to the only men sits on board. In 
relations to that, this study is interested to observe the firms’ capital structure. 
Capital structure is one of the important decisions made by board of director which it is 
known as the proportion of debt and equity financing of a firm. It simplifies that how well 
business operations of a company is financed. Capital structure can be a mixture of long-term 
debt, short-term debt, common equity, and preferred equity. Commonly, capital structure is 
referring to the firm leverage, whereby leverage is an amount of debt uses to finance firms 
assets. Leverage has brought two primary advantages, which are enhancing the firm earnings 
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and a favourable tax treatment of interest expense. Other than that, many companies use 
leverage compared to equity capital because by issuing more equity, it reduces the earnings 
per share of existing shareholders.  
Thus, some of the researches indicate that, highly leveraged firms have more debt than 
equity. While, low leveraged firms considered having more equity than debt. A lot of 
research have been done with various decisions on capital structure. It has been an interesting 
issue for many researchers where they conduct a research in the developed countries such as 
the United States of America (U.S) and European countries. Myers (1984); Titman & 
Wessels (1988); and Rajan & Zingales (1995) are the pioneer of this study on capital 
structure using international data in their research. Decision on capital structure seems to 
have abroad effect towards firm sustainability as well as profitability. However, the female 
directors are expected to give an impact on the corporate capital structure. In term of 
management, female directors are less likely to issue debt, less likely to make significant 
changes to capital structure in general and to reduce leverage. The presence of women in the 
company board or directors could give advantages to everyone, especially investors, staff, 
creditors and others. 
1.2 Problem Statements 
The percentage of women are still low in the global workforce. The most important step to 
build a great and strong culture is to anticipate both gender participation in the workplace. An 
organizations should focus on promoting gender diversity in order to achieve goals in gender 
equality.  
Gender diversity is one of the attributes that can show effectiveness of member in a board of 
directors to take control of an organization. Abdullah & Ismail (2013) found that Malaysian 
companies have lack of diversity on the board and its effect on firms performance are mixed. 
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Low, Roberts, & Whiting (2015) examine on Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia and 
Singapore found that, firm performance will positively affect the number of female board of 
director.  
There are numerous studies conducted on the topic of board gender diversity, but only 
focused on the relationship with firm financial performance (Rose, 2007; Marimuthu & 
Kolandaisamy, 2009;  Abdullah & Ismail, 2013; Shukeri, Shin, & Shaari, 2012; Gharba & 
Abubakar, 2014; and Low, Roberts, & Whiting, 2015) but very limited with firm capital 
structure. Gharba & Abubakar (2014) supported that there are positive relationship between 
board gender diversity and firm performance. Thus, this creates research gap in the study of 
female director involvement at the highest level of management and it seems to have 
significant effect on firm’s capital structure as it relation towards firm performance. As far 
for now, the relationship between female director and capital structure is relatively 
unexplored in Malaysia context.  
Just a few claimed that the increasing number of female board director could be the 
advantages as a firm might be able to have a have greater profit, greater pay and also to 
enhance problem solving. The most important goal is to encourage a company to add more 
women into their board. Women still have a long way to go to reach parity with men in the 
boardroom and should certainly to be given every opportunity to pursue directorships. 
Usually women are described as supportive, collaborative and helpful in performance reviews 
while men are more likely to have words like drive, transform, innovative and tackle included 
in their reviews. Hence, women are seldom be given the opportunity compared to men who 
got the ideal selection criterias such as driven and innovative. 
Participation of women in the organization is still beyond reach in Malaysia. In 2017, 
Malaysian government had issued a new Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
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and it has becoming a serious topic for Malaysian researcher to investigate the new code that 
is pointed out from the MCCG. One of the important code is that, large firms need to have at 
least 30 percent of women appointed as board of director. Since Malaysian is a developing 
countries, thus the corporate governance practices and systems in Malaysia are still new 
compared to developed countries such as the United States of America (U.S) and European 
countries. 
In the global context, successful women who are often perceived as whingers, weak, and 
unsuitable for leadership positions. Goverment has a very crucial role in this scheme of 
works. If organizations are serious in expanding diversity in their workplace and taking 
advantage of many skilled and talented women, then real actions should be done.  
The presence of a few women as a board of director in a company may bring significant 
moderating effect on the relations between the board age and board size, and corporate 
laverage. Using 2007-2008 data of the UK private companies, Wilson & Altanlar (2009) 
investigate insolvency risk in their study and found that high ratio of female directors is 
associated with lower insolvency risk and it shows stronger negative relationship. 
1.3 Research Questions 
In order to attain the research objective, the following research questions need to be 
answered. The research questions of this study are; 
i. What is the relationship between the number of female director who sits on board of 
director and capital structure of listed companies in Malaysia? 
ii. What is the relationship between expertise of female director who sits on board of 
director and capital structure of listed companies in Malaysia? 
iii. What is the relationship between independent female director who sits on board of 
director and capital structure of listed companies in Malaysia? 
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1.4 Research Objectives 
This research objective mainly focusing on the effect of female director towards the firm 
capital structure. Specifically, the below objectives have been identified; 
i. To examine the relationship between the number of female director who sits on board 
of director and capital structure of listed companies in Malaysia. 
ii. To examine the relationship between expertise of female director who sits on board of 
director and capital structure of listed companies in Malaysia. 
iii. To examine the relationship between independent female director who sits on board 
of director and capital structure of listed companies in Malaysia. 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
The first significant of this study is the effect of women involvement on board of director 
towards firm capital structures in Malaysia. The result of this study provides some insights 
towards the capital structure of appointment a female director as a board of director in top 
100 Malaysian public listed companies based on market capitalization. From this study, it is 
hoped that it will create awareness nationally that a female director is an important factor and 
can influence board strategic involvements. 
Second, findings of these results can be used as a facilitating mechanism for regulator which 
is the Securities of Commissioners of Malaysia to have a clear picture on prior data and at the 
same time to support and to enhance the policies and procedures which are in line with 
MCCG 2017. This contribution will help to assess prior data before the new MCCG has been 
released on 2017. Other than that,  some prediction and amendment may be done to create a 
better code of corporate governance in the future. The companies compliance predictions can 
be assessed whether large company follow at least thirty percent of board member is women 
as imposing of new MCCG in year 2017. Moreover, government imposed the 30% club 
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earlier on year 2015 which is two years before new MCCG 2017. Therefore, assessment on 
how fast the companies react to the government intention to promote women in board of 
director position can be known. 
Lastly, the result from this study will contribute to the researchers as a literature for corporate 
governance mechanism because the findings on the relationship between female director and 
capital structure are relatively unexplored in Malaysia context as a developing country. At the 
same time, this research may show the 30% percentage of women that is set by the 
government still far away or not based on result from sample tested.  
1.6 Scope of the Study 
This research mainly emphasizes on the relationship between female participation on board 
of director with firm capital structure. On this purpose, the study uses top 100 public listed 
companies in Malaysia of 2016 annual reports. This study measures female director through 
three proxy variables, which are number of female director on board of director, expertise of 
female director and independent female director. Last but not least, this study measures the 
capital structure through the accounting variable which is firm debt ratio. 
1.7 Organization of Chapters 
This study is organized into five chapters. The first chapter comprises the background of the 
study, problem statement, research question and objectives, significant of the study, scope of 
the study, and organizations of chapters. 
The second chapter reviews the literature on capital structure and its relationship with female 
director variable in this study. 
The third chapter focuses on the hypotheses development. Other than that, it includes 
theoretical framework and followed by the view of related theories 
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The fourth chapter focuses on the research methodology used, which includes the research 
design, population, source and method of data collection, and method of data analysis.  
The fifth chapter discusses the analysis and findings and interpretation on data to answer the 
objectives and hypotheses of the study. All the answers are shown in table of structure to ease 
the understanding and to provide a clear explanation of the research results. 
The final chapter presents the conclusions, implications, limitations of the study, and 
suggestions for future study. 
1.8 Chapter Summary 
This chapter demonstrates the overview of the study by highlighting the introduction of 
study, the background of the study, problem statement, research questions and research 
objectives, significance of this study and later the scope of the study. Besides, this chapter 
describes the structure of the study. The next chapter reviews the literature on capital 
structure and its relationship with female director variable in this study. 
 





Westphal & Stern (2006) conduct an investigation on how the female directors encourage the 
appointments of the boards within managements integration meanwhile, Westphal & Milton 
(2000) found impact within an experience and networking. There are some prior studies 
carried out on how female directors participation such as their contributions towards the 
board of directors role and work (Terjesen et al., 2009). A few empirical studies explore the 
effect of female presence on boards basically on its direct correlation between the percentage 
of female directors and firm performance. The studies come out with mixed contributions; 
some find a positive correlation (Carter et al., 2003; and Erhardt et al., 2003), while others 
find no significant or even negative correlation (Shrader et al., 1997; and Rose, 2007). 
The relation between firms performance and the increasing of female presence on board of 
directors critically decide whether, and how, to actualize the women contribution by 
enhancing the regulations due to the financial achievements influenced by them. Besides, 
there are some empirical studies which examine the relationship between firm financial 
performance and gender diversity. However, their contributions are mixed. Thus, these show 
that the correlation between firm financial performance and gender diversity brings empirical 
gap and creates unreliability for policymaker, board of director, and investors around the 
globe to predict an actual effect related to the female directors. 
This chapter discussed the previous researcher’s findings related to the female director 
involvement and firm capital structure especially as member in board of director. In addition, 
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there is limited literature research for this study. Thus, this research uses gender diversity 
literature to relate the presence of female director and it impact on firm performance. 
Moreover, in this chapter, it focuses on a few research methodologies. For example, number 
of sample used in their research and the model used for the study. Apart from that, this 
section also discussed about the factors used that may affects the correlation between capital 
structure and female directors. 
2.2 Prior Studies 
Nyamweya (2015) points out that capital structure is the means of financing a firm and 
greatly influences shareholders returns and risks. There are two methods that can be used in 
capital structure decision making, where firm can be finance either through debt or equity. 
Firms can use variety of funding through capital structure options either to issue a large or a 
small amount of debt. In addition, Abor (2007) argue that, there are several capital structure 
options can be choose by firm (for example, lease financing, issue warrants, issue convertible 
bonds, sign forward contract or trade in the bond swaps). Myers (2001) found that firms used 
combined source and financing to invest in real estate. Other than that, the most important 
thing is options that choose must maximizing the shareholders wealth (Abor & Biekpe, 
2005). 
Existing empirical evidence on capital structure is mainly using data from developed 
countries such as the United States of America (U.S) and European countries. For example, 
Bradley et al. (1984); Friend & Lang (1988); Friend & Hasbrouck (1988); Titman & Wessels 
(1988); and Chaplinsky & Niehaus (1993) study on the United States companies; Kester 
(1986) focused on the United States and Japanese companies; and Rajan & Zingales, (1995) 
focused on G7 countries companies. However, in recent year research about developing 
countries started to appear (e.g. Booth et al., 2001; and Huang & Song, 2002). 
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In the meantime, there are a lot of studies related to firms’ specific factor that may give 
impact to the capital structure (for example, firm size, board size, board composition, firm 
age, tangibility, liquidity, and investment opportunities).  
Marsh (1982) using the UK companies between year 1959 and 1974 found that the larger the 
firm is the higher the proportion of debt it may get except for firms with higher probability of 
bankruptcy which tend to lower their debt activities. On the other hand, Marsh (1982) found 
that size and leverage have negative correlation, meanwhile Friend & Lang (1988); and 
Friend & Hasbrouck (1988) found that leverage and size have positive correlation. Other than 
that, Kester (1986) argue that leverage have positive correlation between firm size and 
growth opportunities, however Titman & Wessels (1988); and Chaplinsky & Niehaus (1993) 
found negative relations. 
In Malaysia context, there a few study carried using Malaysian public listed companies data 
(for example, Dzolkarnaini, 2005; Fraser, Zhang, & Derashid, 2006; and Bliss & Gul, 2012). 
Research conducted by Dzolkarnaini (2005) on topic the capital regime and capital structure 
determinants always cited by researchers. Dzolkarnaini (2005) examines eight years data 
from 1994 to 2002 of Malaysian public listed companies found that, firm size, profitability 
and liquidity is the determinant of capital structure. Then, the firm with same industry are 
correlated with the leverage level when market condition are well (Dzolkarnaini, 2005). 
Meanwhile, Fraser, Zhang, & Derashid (2006) investigates capital structure using 257 
Malaysian public listed company with 10 years time frame between 1990 to 1999 found that 
political connections firms will carrying more debt compared to the non-political connections 
firms, this is due to the company easy to make loan cause of government link and have lower 
bankruptcy risk. A part of that, Fraser et al. (2006) clarify that, tangibility and firm size have 
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negative correlation with capital structure except for investment opportunities which is 
negative correlated. 
On the other hand, continuously from Fraser et al. (2006) study, Bliss & Gul (2012) examines 
top 500 non-finance Malaysian public listed companies in term of market capitalization. 
Then, the data gathered using four years started from the year 2001 until 2004 found that, the 
the political connection firms have positive correlation between capital structure for 
tangibility, firm size, and investmet opportunities. 
There are few studies that investigate the effect of female participation in board of directors 
towards the amount of debt financing by the firms. For example Harris (2014) using 78 firms 
of U.S public companies as their total sample with two year period 2012 and 2013 of 
investigation found that there are significant negative relationship between board with at least 
25% women in board of director and firms leverage. The board of director that have greater 
gender diversity will avoid the tendency to get involve with bankruptcy risk and financial 
distress associates with the debt financing and finding other source of fundings (Harris, 
2014). 
Then, in the other cases, Tu, Loi, & Yen (2015) collected data of 70 largest banks in ASEAN 
which is Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia using period start from year 2009 to 2013 founds 
that, women on board of directors positive and significantly impact the firms performance. 
Apart from that, the relation between percentages of women also carried out by Tu et al. 
(2015) found that there is neutral effect on firm’s performance. In the other hand, also using 
sample data of 32 commercial banking in Kenya within the period of 1998-2009 found that 
there is no effect between the board gender diversity with the firm performance due to male 
domination on total board of director (Wachudi, 2012). 
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Low et al. (2015) using the empirical evidence from Hong Kong, South Korea, Malaysia and 
Singapore finds that positive relation between the number of female board of director with 
firm performance. Other than that, Low et al. (2015) study found that the advantages of the 
female board of director will be reduce in the country that have higher female economics 
paticipation as well as empowerment due to cultural resistence. Ahern & Dittmar (2012) 
stated that if there are more female director presence on the board of director, male directors 
will change their behaviour to response on the observing the financial impact. 
Meanwhile, Isabel et al. (2010) using listed Spanish corporations on the Madrid Stock 
Exchange over the period 2004 to 2006 found that firm performance for highly gender 
diversity is not so much different with lower gender diversity. This conclude that the level of 
gender diversity do not affect the firm performance. Support the result is Yasser (2012), were 
using the Karachi Stock Exchange (KSE) 100 Index firms from Pakistan Stock Exchange 
(PSE) between the years 2008 till 2010 period of time. Then, the study use two-stage least-
squares estimation and economic valued added (EVA) as performance measurement 
methods. Thus, the study found that firm performance has the insignificant correlations with 
the board gender diversity. 
Moreover, Simpson et al. (2010) also study the relationship between firm financial 
performance with ethnic and gender diversity by using the data of the U.S based corporation 
listed in S&P 500, found that difference in law, cultural environment, geography and the 
other factor effect the board diversity on board performance is no relations between variables.  
At the same time, Rose (2007) using the sample data old danish firms also found that there 
are no effect between female involvement in board because of their need to adapt with 
traditional way. Nevertherless, female directors is more independent than male and this 
impact to the better monitoring (Simpson, Carter, & D'Souza, 2010). 
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Gender diversify can affects firms decision making as well as firms capital strcuture, thus 
women sits on board potentially influences the leverage decision. Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer 
(1999) using meta analysis found that between 14 high risk task given, male takes 12 of the 
task including gambling. This shows that female are more risk averse compared to male. 
Other study conduct using face reading software read by emotions (fear, surprise, happiness, 
andanger) indicates that female remain more risk averse than male (Nguyen & Noussair, 
2014). In line with that, Croson & Gneezy (2009) using cognitive approaches to measure the 
emotional reactions towards given risky situation found that female tend to react nervouse 
and fear.  
A study carried out by Eriksson & Simpson (2010) using lottery mechanism found that 
women are less likely to enter the lottery because they show stronger emotions reaction to 
losing. In addition, female also less likely to play competitive games compare to male and 
their play games that does not have clear ending and at the same time the games have no 
winner (Campbell, 2013). It is a clear viewpoint that women tend to react more towards 
defensive or risk averse when comes to the high risk matter.  
Then, Ravina (2008) examines personal characteristics of borrowers, such as gender 
attractiveness, and ethnicity, then found that women are more likely to be considered 
beautiful and trustworthy, but, interestingly, not creditworthy. Addition, Pope & Sydnor 
(2011) found that women pays less interest on loan compared to men. Besides that, Byrnes, 
Miller, & Schafer (1999) find that women are less likely to take risks than men. So, based on 
the literature women are less likely to take financial risks and this characteristic referred as 
risk averse. Thus, women can be considered to play their role towards risk averse. This 
characteristics influences women to argue more when involve higher risk such as debt 
financing. 
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2.3 Chapter Summary 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the past studies regarding female and capital 
structure relationship. This chapter includes the prior literature about the female and capital 
structure. Furthermore, this chapter also describes the over review of relation of women and 
risk averse personality. The next chapter focuses on the theoretical framework, and followed 
by the view of related theories as well as hypotheses development. 
 





This chapter discusses the research framework and hypotheses development according to 
nature of study. Thus, this chapter is divided into following subsection; framework of the 
study, related theories and hypotheses development.  
3.2 Framework of the Study 
The research framework of this study concentrates on the women directors toward the firm’s 
capital structure. This study attempts to examine the correlation between the female director 
such as their number, expertise, and independent, with Malaysian public listed company 
capital structure.  
The next figure demonstrated the study’s research model along all variables of study. The 
previous well-established framework used by Fraser, Zhang, & Derashid (2006) which 
duplicate in this study as shown in Figure 3.1. Despite of that, the explanation and discussion 
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3.3 Related Theories 
Capital structure or leverage views how much firms finance their operating and investing 
activity by using borrowing or debt instead of issuing firms stock or equity in order to gain 
higher productivity and profitability. In explaining the factors that influencing leverage, 
corporate finance literature stated that there are two (2) fundamental theories exist. First is the 
trade-off theory and second is the pecking order theory. Myers (1984) builds the pecking 
order theory. These theories are used to acknowledge the effect of finance decision made by 
the management with their behavioral differential, generally in between the board of 
directors’ composition with finance choices. However, this study focuses to use the agency 
cost theory. This is due to involvement female director on board of directors which will 
create agency problem in the business environment. 
3.3.1 Agency Cost Theory 
Agency theory can be defined as the principal-agent relationship that bound them together. 
As an example, board of directors is an agent for Shareholders (principle) where agent will be 
paid for performing the duties on principle behalf. Basically, the conflict of interest between 
principle and board of directors make the agency cost to arise. In 1976, Jesen and Meckling  
introduced the implication of the conflict by developing the capital structure theory agency 
expanding from the work of Fama & Miller (1972). They found that the conflict of interest 
between principle and managers make the increasing of agency cost or “equity agency cost”. 
Then, debt agency cost occurs due to the conflict between creditors and principle (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Moreover, Jesen & Meckling (1976) argued that, by decreasing the equity 
cost may affect the increasing of the agency cost. In this way, it would be an ideal connection 
when one (1) of the two (2) costs of corporate ended up plainly insignificant with capital 
structure. Hence, if the board of director keep on decreasing the conflict of interest with the 
principle, it may reduce the agency cost as well. 
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Meanwhile, the most popular stream of literature focuses on incentive alignment, particularly 
compensation policies (Shapiro, 2005). This theory provides how the agents play their roles 
to satisfy their principle and at the same time to satisfy own interest. Ownership structure is 
strongly associated with diversification. This is consistent with the joint hypotheses that 
diversification represents a type of agency conflict, and equity owner- ship structure affects 
the magnitude of agency problems (Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1999). On the other hand, agency 
theory has similarity with an organizations political model, where both theory and model 
speculate through individual and organizational level by self-interest and goal conflict, 
respectively. Agency theory helps us that much to remember business life, in any case, 
depends on self-intrigue (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
3.4 Hypotheses Development  
A hypothesis can be defined as assumption or expected results that may be carried out from 
the variable that interested in the research. This study focus is carried out by three hypotheses 
as shown below. 
3.4.1 Total Female Director on Board 
A female director that sits on board of directors seems to perform their role in a more 
efficient and effective way. Moreover, it gives an impact in decision making especially 
related to financial aspect. Ahern & Dittmar (2012) found that, larger number of female sits 
on board of director influence man decision towards financial impact. Apart from that, 
Rovers (2013) studies shows that board of director will be more effective due to female 
involvement compared to companies without female participation. Monitoring on 
management and board effort will be more effective impact from board diversity (Adams & 
Ferreira, 2009). 
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Besides as discussed earlier, women’s attitude is more toward risk averse compared to men 
(Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999). Thus, women tend to engage in debates and bring diverse 
opinion in boardroom discussion due to the effect from risk averse (Pearce & Zahra. 1991; 
and letendre, 2004). Adams & Ferreira (2009) found that participation of female directors in 
company meetings show a good presence record compared to man and put an effort to 
observe the executive directors. Firms financing choice found empirically to board diversity, 
where higher gender diversity brings board member more efficient and brings an advantage 
by lowering the information asymmetry between shareholders and management (Alves et al., 
2014). 
Female directors brings diversity on board of directors especially on monitoring and risk 
averse personality reduces the conflict of interest that arise among shareholders and 
managements. In agreement with agency theory which reduces the conflict of interest with 
the principle, it may reduce the agency cost as well. Therefore, according to this study, it 
hypothesized the relationship between number of female directors and capital structure as 
follow: 
H1: There is a significant and negative relationship between number of female directors 
and capital structure on listed companies in Malaysia 
3.4.2 Female Director Expertise 
Peterson & Philpot (2007) found that, women directors qualification bring along the impact 
in their work as board of directors. Furthermore,  Singh, Terjesen, & Vinnicombe (2008) 
stated that as women directors does have non-traditional background the difference between 
male and female directors is in term of prior profesional experiences. In line with that 
Ruigrok, Peck, & Tacheva (2007) found that women director who are involve in financial or 
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an accounting function tend to be elected as executive position compared to those who are 
not in that field rarely selected.  
In addition, women directors that are the holder of advance degrees and those who are from 
non-business background are more likely to get involved in executive positions (Singh, 
Terjesen, & V. Vinnicombe, 2008). Board members who are with finance background tend to 
think twice before making a decision on finance choice because it may give impact on the 
future of the firms especially female directors. Difference in educational or experience 
background brings significant impact towards the firmness of the financial decision among 
board of directors especially role play by female directors. This effectiveness of choice may 
also lower the conflict of interest between shareholders and managements as highlighted by 
agency theory. Therefore, according to this study hypothesized the relationship between 
female directors expertise and capital structure as follow: 
H2: There is a significant and negative relationship between female directors expertise 
and capital structure on listed companies in Malaysia. 
3.4.3 Independent Female Director 
Independent female director can be referred as outsides directors or non-executive directors 
known as non-management member of the board as previouse studies (Baysinger & Butler, 
1985;  Daily & Dalton, 1992; Daily & Dalton, 1993; Abor, 2007; kyereboah & biekpe, 2006; 
and Bokpin & Arko, 2009). The term outside directors are commonly used in the U.S, 
meanwhile the term non-executive directors are more preferred in UK. 
On the other hand, Weisbach (1988) found that non-executive directors are more strict in 
performing their duties because they are not involved in management of the company. 
Eventhough they are not involved in the company as the full-time staffs, but they still will be 
the eyes of the law as the company board of directors. In addition, the increasing number of 
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outside director at the same time provides segregation of responsibility of chairman and chief 
executive officer improve the viability of the board (Fama, 1980). Independent female 
directors seem to help in decision making especially related to finance decision and risk 
averse effects the firm financing choice. It also reduces the agency cost that arises between 
the shareholders and managements. Independent female directors influences the board of 
directors decisions and enhances the board effectiveness. Therefore according to this study, it 
hypothesized the relationship between independent female directors and capital structure as 
follow: 
H3: There is a significant and negative relationship between independent female 
directors and capital structure on listed companies in Malaysia. 
3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter highlighted the hypotheses that have been formulated. Moreover, this chapter 
also shows a clarification of the theory used and hypotheses formulation. In addition, this 
chapter discusses the theory that related to the study. Then, the next chapter focuses on the 
research methodology, which includes the research design, population, source and method of 
data collection, and method of data analysis.  
  





This chapter discusses the research methodology according to nature of study. Kothari (2001) 
defines research methodology as a systematic way to provide an explanation of problem by 
collecting data and analysing statistically. This chapter is divided into the following 
subsection; research design, population of the study, sample size, sampling technique, source 
of data, method of data collection, specific study variables, method of data analysis and data 
collection instrument. 
4.2 Research Design 
This part involves two processes, the first one is data gathering and second one is the 
analysing of data. Generally, tests are perform to clarify the association as well as the nature 
between dependent variable with independent variables as well as control variables. Other 
than that, this study uses quantitative data analysis since the collection of data is based on 
quantitative method. 
4.3 Population of the Study 
The population of this study involved the top 100 Malaysian public listed companies based 
on market capitalization which listed in Malaysia Stock Exchange for the period under study 
which is year 2016. This is due to the latest data that is provide on Malaysia Stock Exchange 
for the year of 2016. Furthermore, this study will cover all the industry in Malaysia except 
financial institutions (Guest, 2008). Only firms that provide reliable data will be taken into 
account as sample for this study purpose. The solid reason on why do this study use the top 
100 companies is because they are well regulated, have higher compliance level and easier 
access of complete information. Then, this study selects top 100 large companies listed on the 
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Malaysia Stock Exchange for financial year end 2016. Table 4.1 shows how the final sample 
was derived after applying the filters. 
Table 4.1 
Final Sample after Applying the Filters 
Filters and Reasons Authors Balance of Companies 
Taken only top 100 companies 
based on the market capitalization.  
Clark & Gibson, (1999); and 
Lins & Warnock, (2004) 
100 
Exclude 11 financial institutions 
because of the difference on the 
financial part.  
(Guest, 2008)  89 




Table 4.1 shows that it took top 100 companies based on market capitalization from total of 
949 companies were downloaded from DataStream. Other than that, eleven financial 
companies substitute with other firms based on market capitalization. 
4.4 Source of Data and Method of Data Collection 
This study uses the secondary data. Document is downloaded through online database 
provide by Malaysian Stock Exchange that covered one year period of 2016 
(www.bursamalaysia.com) known as Bursar Malaysia. Apart from that, if there is any related 
statistics carried out by any bulletins or journal, the research will use them as a reference to 
provide a reliable collection of data. Financial data is collected through DataStream and other 
data is gathered manually from the annual report. Any data which is then not available from 
DataStream is collected from financial statements in the Bursa Malaysia website. The 
finalized total number of sample to study is 100 samples of large firm are tested. 
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4.5 Measurement of the Variables 
This section provides measurements of dependent variable, independent variables and control 
variables. The explanation of the measurements of the variables for the study laid down in 
detail in the following paragraphs.  
The following is the previous well-established model used by Fraser, Zhang, & Derashid 
(2006) which duplicate in this study as follows: 
DBTAST it = α + β1PWOM it + β2PEXP it + β3PINDP it + β4FSIZE it + β5BSIZE it + 
β6BCOMP it + β7FAGE it + β8TANG it + β9LIQ it + β10MKBV it + ε it 
The definitions of all the variables are following: 
α = Constant 
β1, β2…. Β10 = Coefficient of explanatory variable 
ε it = Random error of variable. 
DBTAST = Sum of total debt divided by total assets is debt ratio 
PWOM = Proportion of female sits on board of director 
PEXP = Proportion of female have financial expertise sits on board of director 
PINDP = Proportion of independent female sits on board of director 
FSIZE = Ln of total assets 
BSIZE = Total number of board of director 
BCOMP = 
The proportion of independent non-executive director divided by 
total number of directors on the board 
FAGE = Total years incorporated 
TANG = Property, plants and machinery divided by total assets 
LIQ = Currents assets divided by current liabilities 
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MKBV = 
Market price of share divided by (Shareholder equity/Number of 
ordinary shares outstanding) 
 
4.6 Study Variables 
In this study, there will be one dependent variable, three independent variables as female 
directors proxies and seven controlled variables. Those variables are described in the 
subsection below. 
4.6.1 Dependent Variable 
4.6.1.1 Capital Structure 
Nyamweya (2015) points out that capital structure is how a firm is being finance and how it 
greatly influences shareholders returns and risks. Leverage is a measurement on how total 
asset of the firm is being financed. Firm can be finance either through debt or equity. It 
basically shows the percentage of debt used to finance the assets of the firm and being 
expressed as the percentage of total debt to total assets. It is often known as debt to assets 
ratio or leverage and can be found by dividing company liabilities or total debts with its total 
assets (Fraser, Zhang, & Derashid, 2006).  
Thus, the use of debt ratio is to calculate the level of debt on organization as it percentage of 
its total assets. Firm can choose the capital structure portfolio which best suits them in order 
to create more wealth to the firm as well as maximizing shareholders wealth. A firm can pick 
numerous assortments from numerous choices of capital structure utilizing which has various 
diverse levels of debt either small or large.  
Meanwhile, Abor (2007) studies stated that managers can lease their financial by using 
various type of capital structure option, such as; issue convertible bonds, issue warrants, enter 
forward contract or exchange the bond swaps. Empirical works on capital structure suggest 
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that leverage is used as measure for capital structure. The studies by Fraser, Zhang, & 
Derashid (2006) found that positive correlation between non-current assets, non-debt shields, 
investment opportunities, and firm size with leverage. Vice versa, negative correlation found 
between volatility, advertising expenditure, probability of bankruptcy, profitability, and 
uniqueness of product with leverage. 
4.6.2 Independent Variables 
4.6.2.1 Female Directors 
In this study, involvement of women in an organization as a board of director member will be 
highlighted to investigate their contribution to the company capital structure decision in 
Malaysia context. In order to investigate female director involvement, this study use the three 
proxies for female director (PWOM, PEXP, and PINDP) to measure their relation towards 
the dependent variable. First proxy is, total female director toward total number of board 
(PWOM) to measure the proportion of female director involve as board member. 
Secondly, total female director with financial expertise over total number of board (PEXP) to 
measure proportion of female director background on financial. Third is, total independent 
female director over total number of board (PINDP) to measure the proportion of 
independent female directors appointed among board member. In this case, female director 
information will manually gathered from firm’s annual report. 
4.6.3 Control Variables 
4.6.3.1 Firm Size 
Firm size is a crucial variable to be put included in this research because firm size is related 
to the firm capital structure through the impact of board of director in decision making 
process. For this variable, it will configure on how to measure the firm size, whether by its 
total employee, or total assets gathered but based on this studies, it is found that the fact that 
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firm’s size can be found by using the natural logarithm of the total assets as a measurement 
(Fraser, Zhang, & Derashid, 2006; Bliss & Gul, 2012; Koyuncu et al., 2010; and Zhang, 
2008). 
4.6.3.2 Board Size 
Board size is characterized as the sum of board of directors sits on the board of the firms 
(Panasian, Prevost, & Bhabra, 2003;  and Levrau & Berghe, 2007). Total board of directors 
found to be varied on each countries resulted from the different of cultures. Thus, there is no 
minimum or standard setup among the firms around the globe. In order to support this 
statement,  Lawler & Conger (2009) stated that the effectiveness of board members to work 
as a team is a vital role not depending on board size.  
From the opposed point of view, Lipton & Lorsch (1992) testify that the number board 
member should not be more than eight or nine for all firms. According to the Heidrick & 
Struggles (2007) studies on European countries, it is found that there are four countries that 
have larger board size between thirteen and nineteen members which are Germany, France, 
Italy and Belgium compared to Switzerland, Netherlands, and the UK came with a smaller 
board size and it is lower than ten members on the board.  
Apart from that, other researcher found that as the board size is larger it tend to act as 
effective viewing to the whole firms as well as firm operation due to board skills and 
expertise (Adams & Mehran, 2003).  Berger et al. (1998) studies show that, there are negative 
correlation between firm capital structure with the board size. Thus, board size uses the total 
number of board of director. 
4.6.3.3 Board Composition 
Abor (2007) found a positive relation on impact of independent director when he studies on 
small and medium sized companies. Both independent and outside directors should sit in 
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company top management level to ensure effectiveness in monitoring (Weisbach, 1988). 
Companies that have lower number of non-executive directors have lower leverage compared 
to the companies that have higher number of non-executive and tend to have greater level of 
debt (Yermack, Ofek, & Berger, 1997). In line with that, Pfeffer (1972) found that higher 
debt leads to higher number of non-executive directors sits on board of directors. There are 
also mixed results found by studies related to capital structure and board composition.  
Wen et al. (2002) conducted a study using data from the year 1996 until 1998 on 60 Chinese 
listed firms indicates that there is a negative correlation between capital structure and board 
composition. Besides that, a bigger percentage of outside directors found negatively related 
with the level of distress among the Chinese firms (Wang & Deng, 2006). Limited access to 
the information in decision making became a factor that influences the negative impact 
between outside directors and firm performance (Lawler & Conger, 2009).  
Wen, Rwegasira, & Bilderbeek (2002) found that monitoring the role played by non-
executive directors affects manager to choose lower capital. In addition, higher board 
composition firms tend to stay in lower financial leverage at the same time aims for higher 
market value of equity. Thus, Wen, Rwegasira, & Bilderbeek (2002) stated that capital 
structure relationship is negatively significant with non-executive directors. This mixed result 
show inconsistency with prior research results. 
4.6.3.4 Firm Age 
Firm age is one of factors that influences the capital structure choice. The older the firm is, 
the higher their internal fund will be in which it comes from firms accumulated retained 
earnings. Apart from that, older firm tend to have a bond with the lenders and may get lower 
rate of interest. As pecking order state, an organization tend to use internal sources rather 
than external sources fund to finance their activities and it will considered as a debt then 
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equity as finance sources. This is because external sources by debt is more cost efficiency 
compared to equity. In addition, firms tend to choose short-term debt compared to the long-
term debt (Myers, 1984).  
The process of this decision making is the reflection from the information asymmetries that 
arise among shareholders and managements. Thus, firm tends to utilize retained earnings as 
internal sources of financing and enables firms to proceeds new investments without the 
consequences of external sources of financing. Younger firms tend to finance through long 
term debt that provide by financial institution (Gregory et al., 2005). After all, there are many 
studies found that there are negative correlation between firm age with capital structure 
(Ahmed et al., 2010; Driffield et al., 2007; and Gregory et al., 2005). 
4.6.3.5 Tangibility 
Tangibility is also known as the assets structure. Assets consist of two types, tangible and 
intangible. Tangible asset is an asset that has a physical form, which is includes both non-
current assets (e.g. machinery, buildings and land) and current assets (e.g. inventory and 
cash). Meanwhile, intangible asset is non-physical assets (e.g. goodwill, trademarks, patents, 
copyrights and brand recognition). Tangibility can be measured through a few methods. 
Thus, this study adopted Fraser, Zhang, & Derashid (2006) measurement, which is measured 
by the percentage of non-current assets to total assets. 
4.6.3.6 Liquidity 
There are various study which argued that liquidity and leverage have a negative and 
significant effect between them. In line with that, Ghasemi & Razak (2016) tested data 300 
Malaysian listed companies from year 2005 until 2013 show that liquid company were less 
leveraged and more regularly finance using own capital. This shows that, a negative 
significant effect is between firms liquidity and capital structure. To support that facts, 
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Ahmad & Aris (2015) indicate that between year 2007 to 2011 for trading and service 
company result, it shows a negative and significant correlation between firms liquidity and 
firms debt decision making in the companies. Other researcher also found negative 
relationship on liquidity and capital structure (e.g.Wahab & Ramli, 2014; Hussain & Miras, 
2015; and Jamal et al., 2013). 
4.6.3.7 Investment Opportunities (MKBV) 
In a simple way of explaining, it is an opportunity to make the financial investments. It is 
measured by using the ratio of price per share to book value equity per share (MKBV). 
MKBV is used as a meaningful measure to the investment opportunities (e.g. Fraser, Zhang, 
& Derashid, 2006).  
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4.7 Research Variables 
 
Table 4.2 




Label Description Prediction 
Debt to Asset Ratio DBTAST Total of debt divided by total assets -  
INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
Label Description Prediction 
Total Female PWOM Total of female director divided by 
total number of board 
Negative 
Female Expertise PEXP Total of female director with financial 
expertise divided by total number of 
board 
Negative 
Independent Female PINDP Total of independent female director 




Label Description Prediction 
Firm Size FSIZE Ln(Total Assets) Positive 
Board Size BSIZE Total Number of Board of Director Positive 
Board Composition BCOMP The proportion of independent non-
executive director divided by total 
number of directors on the board 
Positive 
Firm Age FAGE Total years incorporated Negative 
Tangible Assets TANG Property, plants and machinery divided 
by total assets 
Positive  





MKBV Market price of share divided by 
(Shareholder equity/Number of 




  34 
 
4.8 Method of Data Analysis 
The study analyses the data by using STATA statistical software and computes the 
measurement by using descriptive statistics and diagnostic tests.  
4.8.1 Descriptive Analysis 
The purpose of descriptive analysis is to calculate the mean, range (minimum and maximum) 
and standard deviation for each variable tested in the study. 
4.8.2 Diagnostic Tests of Data Analysis  
Normality, heteroscedasticity, and multicollinearity are the common diagnostic tests to be 
conducted before analysis and econometric modelling can be done (Carneiro, 2006). These 
three (3) tests were conducted in this study in order to prove that there is a high possibility 
that econometric assumptions are not violated and to obtain truthful results. 
4.8.3 Normality Test 
Normality is described as the shape of the distribution of data for single quantitative data 
variable and its normal distribution. It is a basic suspicion in multivariate analysis that 
follows the premise that a significant deviation from normality will result in false measurable 
of outcome (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006). 
According to Tabachnick & Fidell (2007) the distribution shape can be observed on a graph. 
The residual distributions according to standardized normal probability plots (pnorm) that are 
sensitive to non-normality in the middle data range were noted.  
4.8.4 Heteroscedasticity Test 
The test for heteroscedasticity of a group of variance is needed in the cross sectional data 
analysis. There are many heteroscedasticity tests available, namely, Goldfeld-Quandt Test, 
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Spearman’s Rank Correlation, Glejser Test, Park Test, White Heteroscedasticity Test and the 
Breush-Pagan Goldfrey Test. 
Consequently, Gujarati (2009) pointed out that there is no answer for the best and most 
powerful test to diagnose the problem. Greene (2003) suggested to use the White 
Heteroscedasticity Test. The Whites test itself has many alternatives and the choice of such a 
test depends on the statistical package used. In the panel data analysis using STATA 
statistical software, a modified Wald test for group wise heteroscedasticity in the residuals 
could measure heterogeneity from the significance of the chi-square value (Greene, 2003). 
4.8.5 Multicollinearity Test 
The cross sectional data analysis is capable of reducing the multicollinearity problem 
(Baltagi, Bratberg, & Holmas, 2005). Multicollinearity checking is a common diagnostic test 
to ensure that none of the independent variables are highly correlated, which can result in 
massive variance bias. The high correlation between two (2) independent variables would 
result in a huge bias in variance, thus, causing the estimations to be unreliable (Baltagi et al., 
2005). The Variance inflation Factor (VIF) is an example of the test that is common to 
examine such a problem. It treats one (1) of the independent variables as dependent variables 
and the remaining independent variables as independent variables. Besides, multicollinearity 
also tested to ensure its value does existed in regression analysis. In the regression model, if 
multicollinearity does existed, it will be a problem to understand the significant of each 
independent variable relationship. Basically, it uses  variance inflation factor (VIF) technique 
to measure the multicollinearity problem. The results should not be lower than 10. 
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4.9 Chapter Summary 
This study aims at investigating the relationship between female directors and firms capital 
structure in Malaysia. This present chapter clarifies the methodology utilized in the study as a 
part of the examination. Then, it also explains the research design and data analysis. The next 
chapter discusses the analysis and findings and interpretation on data in respond to the 
objectives and hypotheses of the study. Finally, all the answer are shown in table structure for 
easy understanding and to provide a clear explanation of the research results. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This section exhibits the analysis of the findings of the study. The data is analysed with the 
use of statistics software. As shown before in chapter three, there are three female directors’ 
variables and one financial performance variable which were measured using debt to assets 
ratio. Moreover, this section is divided into nine sub-sections which are as follows; Section 
5.1 starts with introduction and Section 5.2 exhibits the descriptive statistics of the variables 
in the study. Section 5.3 discusses diagnostic tests of data and linear regression analysis is 
presented in Section 5.4. Section 5.5 discusses about the regression results. Additionally, 
section 5.6 presents the further test. Section 5.7 shows the regression result for further test. 
Discussion of the finding is explained in section 5.8. Finally, Section 5.9 ends with the 
summary of the chapter. 
5.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Descriptive analysis is conducted to provide brief information about the sample target that 
can prompt simple and better elucidation of data (Genser, Cooper, Yazdanbakhsh, Barreto, & 
Rodrigues, 2007). Table 5.1 exhibits the mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum 
of the variables shown in the study.  
The descriptive statistics for the independent and dependent variables have been abridged and 
exhibits in Table 5.1 that included the information of mean, standard deviation, minimum, 
and maximum of the variables in the study. With the application of linear regression analysis, 
the scores might greatly affect the results and turn into a reason for concern by the researcher. 
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The means, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum resulting from the analysis software 
were displayed in the table below. 
Table 5.1 
Summary of Descriptive Statistics N=100 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum 
DBTAST 0.225451 0.201497 0.00011 0.85842 
PWOM 0.159994 0.112824 0 0.42857 
PEXP 0.110119 0.101353 0 0.42857 
PINDP 0.091442 0.092649 0 0.375 
FSIZE 15.45796 1.513226 12.91222 18.70489 
BSIZE 8.88 1.939905 5 14 
BCOMP 0.724212 0.180278 0.230769 1 
FAGE 31.67 14.16573 4 57 
TANG .0840617 .1736419 0.00000 .77828 
LIQ 5.582484 7.400742 .06062 29.06268 
MKBV 2.780662      2.73301      .04345    14.02864 
DBTAST = Total of debt divided by total assets; PWOM = Total of female director divided by total number of 
board; PEXP = Total of female director with financial expertise divided by total number of board; PINDP = 
Total of independent female director divided by total number of board; FSIZE = Ln(Total Assets); BSIZE = 
Total Number of Board of Director;  BCOMP = The proportion of independent non-executive director divided 
by total number of directors on the board; FAGE = Total years incorporated; TANG = Property, plants and 
machinery divided by total assets; LIQ = Currents assets divided by current liabilities; MKBV = Market Price 
of Share divided by (Shareholder Equity/Number of Ordinary Shares Outstanding). 
 
Based on Table 5.1 above, it shows the results for descriptive statistics taken from the 
variables incorporated into the model. The descriptive statistics comprise of mean, standard 
deviation, minimum and maximum. Taking into account the descriptive analysis as 
condensed in Table 5.1, the mean value of the debt to assets ratio (DBTAST) is 0.2254513 
with a minimum value of 0.00011 and the maximum of 0.85842. The minimum value is from 
Westports Holdings Berhad and the maximum value represents the Malaysia Building 
Society Berhad. The minimum and maximum of the debt ratio shows what percentage of debt 
the company used to finance its assets. Thus, there are companies in the sample are highly 
leveraged. 
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The mean for PWOM is approximately 16% and the standard deviation is 11%. This shows 
the low ratio for the total number of women on board. From the data collected, it is found that 
twenty one companies did not have female director sits on the board such as Batu Kawan 
Bhd, Fraser & Neave Holdings Bhd, Berjaya Auto Bhd, Genting Bhd and others. In addition, 
the highest number of female director found is three for eighteen companies. The mean for 
PEXP is 11% and the standard deviation is about 10%. Moreover, thirty three companies 
found did not have female director with financial expertise.  
Other than that, from eighteen companies, there are six companies which are found to have 
three female director that have financial expertise and which also signify the lower 
participation of female directors from finance background in the sample companies. The 
maximum value of PWOM and PEXP is about 42.9% represent from Digi.Com Bhd. Then, 
the mean for PINDP is 9.1% and the standard deviation is about 9.3%. The maximum value 
is 35% and minimum value is 0% represent nineteen companies. Thus, PINDP also signifies 
the lower participation of independent female directors in the sampled companies. 
With regards to firm size (FSIZE) in log of total assets, the result in Table 5.1 reveals that the 
number of firm size mean is around 15.45796 for Malaysian public listed companies with a 
minimum of 12.91222 and a maximum of 18.70489. The board size (BSIZE) mean is about 9 
members with a minimum of 5 members and a maximum of 14 members, showing that all the 
Malaysian public listed companies in the sample have an adequate number of 9 directors sits 
on board and large companies tend to have more directors (Guest, 2009). Then, for the 
BCOM the mean stated is 72% and 18% for standard deviation. The mean for FAGE is 31 
years, which signifies that the average Malaysian firms‟ age is moderate because the value 
for minimum is 4 years while the maximum is 57 years. Since the standard deviation for firm 
age is 14 years, the deviation between the ages is not too high. 
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The firm tangibility (TANG) showed a mean of 8.4% and the standard deviation is about 
17% indicating that a large proportion of the top 100 companies have low tangibility with a 
minimum of 0.00000 and a maximum of 0.77828. Regarding firm Liquidity (LIQ) the mean 
value is 5.58248 with the minimum 0.06062 and the maximum 29.06268 in Malaysian public 
listed companies, whereas the prior study in Malaysia shows the mean value as 3.310 with 
the minimum 0.097 and the maximum 37 (see Ghasemi & Razak, 2016). Lastly, investment 
opportunities (MKBV), the Malaysian public listed companies in the specimen with a mean 
of 2.78066 with minimum change of 0.04345 and maximum change of 14.02864. 
5.3 Diagnostic Tests 
Research diagnostics are carried out to enhance the validity of the outcomes from regression 
analysis by recognizing and rectifying the model from regression related problems such as 
non-normality, heteroscedasticity, autocorrelation, and multicolinearity (Gujarati & Porter, 
2003; and Hair Jr, Black, Babin, Anderson, & Tatham, 2006) tests have been carried out in 
this study. The discussions are as follows: 
5.3.1 Normality Test 
The normality issue is tested using Skewness / Kurtosis test. In order to determine whether 
the data is normal enough for further statistical test, normality test is conducted. Under this 
normality test, the main concern is the distribution of score on variables and this is conducted 
by examining the value of skewness (symmetry of the distribution) and kurtosis (peakedness 
of the distribution). According to Klein (1998) the data is normally distributed when the 
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Table 5.2 
Summary of the test N=100 
Variable Skewness Kurtosis 
DBTAST 0.7343543 2.896229 
PWOM 0.1947241 2.360967 
PEXP 0.6068458 2.778137 
PINDP 0.7645691 3.109869 
FSIZE -0.1225924 2.196593 
BSIZE 0.4537486 2.676071 
BCOMP -0.4918708 2.562725 
FAGE -0.1778095 2.186060 
TANG 2.225845 7.119361 
LIQ 1.608337 4.443231 
MKBV 1.940294 7.247224 
DBTAST = Total of debt divided by total assets; PWOM = Total of female director divided by total number of 
board; PEXP = Total of female director with financial expertise divided by total number of board; PINDP = 
Total of independent female director divided by total number of board; FSIZE = Ln(Total Assets); BSIZE = 
Total Number of Board of Director;  BCOMP = The proportion of independent non-executive director divided 
by total number of directors on the board; FAGE = Total years incorporated; TANG = Property, plants and 
machinery divided by total assets; LIQ = Currents assets divided by current liabilities; MKBV = Market Price of 
Share divided by (Shareholder Equity/Number of Ordinary Shares Outstanding). 
 
The result in Table 5.2 shows that all variables are normally distributed. Thus, the descriptive 
statistics provide reliable data on normality and the result of the final model utilizing these 
data are supported. 
5.3.2 Heteroscedasticity Test 
 
Heteroscedasticity or what is generally known as the unequal variance is viewed as one of the 
common transgression. It is known in multivariate analysis in which the residual in regression 
measurement is heteroscedasticity. Heteroscedasticity shows up with any expansion or 
reduction of the variance and this prompts statistical extrapolation issues within the 
regression model. The homoscedastic presumption should be analyzed prior to employing 
regression analysis on the outcomes.  
Heteroscedasticity can be identified through graphical tests whereby the residuals of the 
model are plotted in contradiction of the anticipated value of firm performance and each 
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descriptive variable to ascertain regardless of whether the model's error terms have consistent 
variances.  
Many tests can be employed in order to identify the heteroscedasticity issue, such as the 
white’s General Heteroscedasticity Test, Spearman’s Rank Correlation Test, Park Test, 
Goldfeld-Quandt Test, Glejser Test and Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey Test. This study has utilized 
Breusch-Pagan-Godfery/Cook-Weisberg Test in order to check for the existence of 
homoscedasticity among the error terms (Gujarati, 2009)  
The problem of heteroscedasticity is taken care of with the assistance of White 
Heteroscedasticity Consistent Variance with the Standard error technique as suggested by 
Gujarati & Porter (2003). Such a test is carried out by statistics software. The above 
technique reduces or expands the standard error as required and the variances prompt the 
respective decline or expansion of t-statistics with the coefficient staying fixed. The outcomes 
do not basically vary from the previous regression with slightly variations in the p-values and 
t-statistic to display the estimator's correction. 
 
Table 5.3 
Test for Model Specification and Heteroscedasticity 
 Chi2 F p-value 
Breusch-Pagan  5.23 - 0.0221 
Ramsey Test  - 3.76 0.0137 
Ho (null)  Reject  Reject 
Note:Ho (null): Constant variance (homoscedasticity). 
 
The result of Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test is shown in Table 5.3. Taking into account 
the result, the p-value is less than 0.05 in the model, indicating that heteroscedasticity exist.In 
statistical analysis, the result shown in Table 5.3 above, Ramsey Test specify that if the F-
  43 
 
statistic is lower that the p-value give significance point, then we accept the null hypothesis 
of correct specification. While the p-value is lower the F-statistic given in Table 5.3. This 
implies that the functional form has problem of heteroscedasticity in the both model Ramsey 
Test and Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg Test. 
5.3.3 Multicolinearity Test 
Multicolinearity is a situation where two or more presumption's variables are extremely 
associated to one another. It refers to the extent to which one variable can be described by the 
other variables in the analysis. As multicolinearity increases, it confuses the interpretation of 
the variety since it is more challenging to determine the impact of any single variable, 
attributable to their interrelationships (Gloede et al., 2013). Research by Mullner et al. (1998) 
stated that multicollinearity is one out of the numerous methods utilized by the researchers to 
check the presence of an irregular relationship between independent variables that more often 
than not clarifies the consequences of which variables influenced can be controlled by 
alternate variables within the study. 
5.3.3.1 Pearson Correlation Matrix 
Roldan-Valadez, Rios, Suarez-May, Favila, & Aguilar-Castaneda (2013) expressed that the 
correlation analysis is important in depicting the direction and strength of the linear 
relationship amongst two variables. More precisely, the Pearson Correlation analysis was 
undertaken to clarify and assess the strengths of the correlation amongst the study variables 
as presented in Table 5.4.  
The correlation coefficient (r) values presented in the Table 5.4 displays the strength of the 
relationship among variables. Hair, Black, Babin, & Anderson (2010) suggested that the 
correlation value of 0 proves no relationship, while the correlation ±1.0 indicates perfect 
correlation. Moreover, interpreted the correlation within 0 and 1.0 which are as follows; the 
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correlation (r) between ±0.1 and ±0.29 indicate little relationship, and then between ±0.30 
and ±0.49 indicate an average relationship and more than ±0.50 displays strong/solid 
relationship. 
Table 5.4 disclosed the Pearson Correlation Matrix among the controlled variables and 
independent variables with the debt to assets ratio of Malaysian PLC’s listed in Malaysia 
stock exchange in assessing the relationship between all variables in this study and capital 
structure by debt to assets ratio. From the Table 5.4, there are few of correlations amongst the 
variables in the model at 1% and 5% significant level. As it shown in Table 5.4 the highest 
level of correlation is seen amongst women expertise (PEXP) and number of women 
(PWOM) with 81% at level of correlation of 1% of significant. 
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Table 5.4 
Summary of Pearson Correlation Matrix 
 DBTAST PWOM PEXP PINDP FSIZE BSIZE BCOMP FAGE TANG LIQ MKBV 
DBTAST 1.0000           
PWOM -0.0233 1.0000          
PEXP -0.1015 0.8113** 1.0000         
PINDP -0.0141 0.6873** 0.6803** 1.0000        
FSIZE 0.2089** -0.0526 0.0342 -0.0176 1.0000       
BSIZE 0.0991 0.1350 0.0624 0.1011 0.3375** 1.0000      
BCOMP 0.0211 0.1918* 0.2800** 0.2816** 0.1832 -0.0318 1.0000     
FAGE 0.0829 -0.1760 -0.1477 -0.1224 -0.1275 -0.1617 -0.0258 1.0000    
TANG 0.3111** 0.0417 -0.0236 0.0222 -0.0199 0.0055 0.0757 -0.0744 1.0000   
LIQ -0.4708** -0.0751 0.0426 -0.1031 -0.1120 -0.1067 -0.0283 -0.0312 -0.0486* 1.0000  
MKBV -0.2093* 0.0093 0.0461 0.0611 -0.1669 0.0283 -0.0146 -0.0014 -0.0249 0.3421** 1.0000 
Notes:  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).  
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
DBTAST = Total of debt divided by total assets; PWOM = Total of female director divided by total number of board; PEXP = Total of female director with financial 
expertise divided by total number of board; PINDP = Total of independent female director divided by total number of board; FSIZE = Ln(Total Assets); BSIZE = 
Total Number of Board of Director;  BCOMP = The proportion of independent non-executive director divided by total number of directors on the board; FAGE = 
Total years incorporated; TANG = Property, plants and machinery divided by total assets; LIQ = Currents assets divided by current liabilities; MKBV = Market Price 
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5.3.3.2 Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) 
The use of Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for every independent variable turned into a 
common strategy for identifying the multicolinearity and to estimation the outcome (Naser, 
Al-Khatib, & Karbhari, 2002). The VIF expressed that if VIF is more than 10, it demonstrates 
that the independent variable in the study has supreme correlation that precise the 
multicollinearity issue. In this study, the researcher joined the multicollinearity diagnostic 
with the VIF while running the linear regression models. 
Table 5.5 reveals the outcome of the multicollinearity issue as VIF for overall independent 
variables is less than 10 which implies that the independent variables are within the normal 
range. It is accordingly presumed that the present study is free from multicollinearity. 
Table 5.5 
Summary of Multicolinearity Test N=100 
Variable Collinearity Statistics 
 Tolerance VIF 
PWOM 0.280341 3.57 
PEXP 0.282424 3.54 
PINDP 0.453620 2.20 
FSIZE 0.764461 1.31 
BSIZE 0.775001 1.29 
BCOMP 0.810938 1.23 
FAGE 0.840412 1.19 
TANG 0.840652 1.19 
LIQ 0.932808 1.07 
MKBV 0.935589 1.07 
Mean VIF  1.77 
DBTAST = Total of debt divided by total assets; PWOM = Total of female director divided by total 
number of board; PEXP = Total of female director with financial expertise divided by total number of 
board; PINDP = Total of independent female director divided by total number of board; FSIZE = Ln(Total 
Assets); BSIZE = Total Number of Board of Director;  BCOMP = The proportion of independent non-
executive director divided by total number of directors on the board; FAGE = Total years incorporated; 
TANG = Property, plants and machinery divided by total assets; LIQ = Currents assets divided by current 
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5.4 Linear Regression Analysis 
In the present study, linear regression analysis is used as a statistical technique to investigate 
the relationship that arise between the dependent variable and the three independent variables 
comprising number of female directors, female directors expertise, independent female 
directors and the seven control variables which are firm size, board size, board composition, 
firm age, tangibility, liquidity and investment opportunities for the hundred top listed 
companies in Malaysia. 
Table 5.6 
Linear Regression Model Summary 
Model R R Square Adjusted R Square 
1 .5623a 0.3162 0.2394 
a) Predictors: (Constant), PWOM, PEXP, PINDP, FSIZE, BSIZE, BCOMP, FAGE, TANG, LIQ, MKBV. 
b) Dependent Variable:  DBTAST 
 
Table 5.6 shows the result from the regression model which is presented by the R square (R
2
) 
and adjusted R square that are used as the explanatory model. The R
2
 in the table above 
explains by percentage of how much the influence of the independent variables and the 
dependent variable. The table display that is 31.62% of the independent variable in this study 
is explained by the dependent variable. The other remaining 68.38% of dependent variable 
was explained by other factors. The 23.94% of the R
2 
is considered acceptable for this kind of 
research because previous studies have obtained lower results (see Fraser, Zhang, & 
Derashid, 2006; and Bliss & Gul, 2012). 
Table 5.7 
ANOVA 










a) Predictors: (Constant), PWOM, PEXP, PINDP, FSIZE, BSIZE, BCOMP, FAGE, TANG, LIQ, MKBV. 
b) Dependent Variable:  DBTAST 
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From the ANOVA table, it shows that the value of F statistic is 0.000. The small results 
(smaller than 0.05) indicates that the independent variables do an excellent job explaining the 
variation in the dependent variable (Poorzamani & Khademi, 2014). 
5.5 Regressions Result  
 
From the results of Table 5.3 the result of Ramsey Test specify that if F-statistic is lower that 
the p-value in the model, indicating that heteroscedasticity exists. In light of these outcomes 
as appeared in Table 5.3 the data was corrected and the problems were corrected by stata. As 
it shown from Table 5.8 the problem of heteroscedasticity was corrected by using stata 
command of correction the errors of heteroscedasticity. 
Table 5.8 
Regression Result of the Debt to Assets Model, N=100 (Dependent = DBTAST) 
Variables Expected Sig Coef. t-value 
PWOM - 0.216059   0.80 
PEXP - -0.347376 -1.06 
PINDP - 0.002060   0.01 
FSIZE + 0.024612    1.62* 
BSIZE + 0.000359  0.03 
BCOMP + 0.007678  0.09 
FAGE - 0.001048  0.80 
TANG + 0.273070      2.09** 
LIQ - -0.010110       -4.05*** 
MKBV - -0.002845 -0.40 
_cons  -0.152057 -0.62 
Number of obs 100 




Prob> F  0.0000 
*** Significant at level 0.01  
** Significant at level 0.05  
* Significant at level 0.1 
DBTAST = Total of debt divided by total assets; PWOM = Total of female director divided by total number of 
board; PEXP = Total of female director with financial expertise divided by total number of board; PINDP = 
Total of independent female director divided by total number of board; FSIZE = Ln(Total Assets); BSIZE = 
Total Number of Board of Director;  BCOMP = The proportion of independent non-executive director divided 
by total number of directors on the board; FAGE = Total years incorporated; TANG = Property, plants and 
machinery divided by total assets; LIQ = Currents assets divided by current liabilities; MKBV = Market Price 
of Share divided by (Shareholder Equity/Number of Ordinary Shares Outstanding). 
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5.6 Further Test 
Section 4.6 In light of these outcomes as appeared in Table 5.3 the further test by using debt 
to equity as dependent variables that tested in the study. For the purpose of testing, each 
interactive variable was originally added to the original model. This test to see the result on 
equity side as we know firm may choose to fund their firms in different ways. 
5.7 Regressions Results for Further Test 
 
Table 5.9 
Regression Result of the Further Test Debt to Equity Model, N=100 (Dependent = DBTEQY) 
Variables Expected Sig Coef. t-value 
PWOM - 0.380541 0.49 
PEXP - -0.037869                   -0.05 
PINDP - -0.616548                   -0.70 
FSIZE + 0.027112 0.78 
BSIZE + 0.008081 0.28 
BCOMP + 0.073653                    0.30 
FAGE - 0.000597 0.19 
TANG + 0.890091     2.40** 
LIQ - -0.019777      -3.53*** 
MKBV - 0.000670 0.04 
_cons  -0.139187 -0.26 
Number of obs 100 




Prob> F  0.0003 
*** Significant at level 0.01  
**   Significant at level 0.05  
DBTEQY = Total of debt divided by total equity; PWOM = Total of female director divided by total number of 
board; PEXP = Total of female director with financial expertise divided by total number of board; PINDP = 
Total of independent female director divided by total number of board; FSIZE = Ln(Total Assets); BSIZE = 
Total Number of Board of Director;  BCOMP = The proportion of independent non-executive director divided 
by total number of directors on the board; FAGE = Total years incorporated; TANG = Property, plants and 
machinery divided by total assets; LIQ = Currents assets divided by current liabilities; MKBV = Market Price 
of Share divided by (Shareholder Equity/Number of Ordinary Shares Outstanding). 
 
Table 5.9 presents the results of the coefficient linear regression for the present study. They 
indicate that if number of female on board increase by one unit, the debt to equity ratio for 
the companies is increased by 38%. For independent female directors and expertise of female 
directors sits on board of director increase by one, the DBTEQY ratio decrease by 3.8% and 
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61.7% respectively. Then, for firm size, board size, board composition, firm age, tangibility, 
and investment opportunities if it is increased by one, the debt to equity ratio is increased by 
2.7%, 0.8%, 7.4%, 0.05%, 89% and 0.06% respectively. One unit increase of liquidity will 
decrease the debt to equity ratio by 2%. 
5.8 Discussions of the Findings 
5.8.1 Debt to Assets Ratio as Dependent Variable 
In probing the hypotheses model using a linear regression analysis, some indicators were 
engaged. Some of that are using the R
2 
coefficient that assesses the robustness of the 
regression equation. It is also referred to as the coefficient of determination which uncovers 
the point of difference between the dependent variable which is described by model of the 
variables. In this study, the R
2 
displays the point of difference of dependent variable 
(DBTAST) which is described by the dependent variable (firm capital structure assessed by 
using debt to asset ratio) results from the collective influence of the independent variable 
namely (number of female directors, female directors expertise, independent female 
directors). Furthermore, when the R
2 
is equivalent to 1 it implies that there is an excellent 
linear connection amongst the dependent and independent variables in the study. Moreover, 
when R
2 
is equivalent to 0, this implies no linear connection existing amongst the dependent 
and the independent variables. As a result, the value/unit under R
2 
exhibits the level of 
difference in the dependent variable (firm capital structure measured by using debt to asset 
ratio) is being described in the model which involves (number of female directors, female 
directors expertise, independent female directors). 
As shown by the results in Table 5.8, the rate of R
2 
in the model is 0.3162. This implies that 
the model describes 31.62% of the difference in firm capital structure assessed by using debt 
to asset ratio. This is being considered as acceptable results. In cases where there is a small 




 value is a rather optimistic overestimation of the real population value 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). R
2 
signifies that 0.3162 percent of the disparity in the dependent 
variable is discussed by the disparities in the independent variables within the study. This 
implies that the deviation in capital structure measured by DBTAST is statistically described 
by the regression equation. Table 5.8 also display that the model is significant (p<0.0l) 
indicating the validity of the model tested.  
In order to answer the hypotheses, standard beta coefficients were utilized. Standardized 
required the values of each different variable to be converted to the same scale for contrast of 
the beta value that is the highest (while disregarding the negative signs). In this way, 
standardized beta coefficients may be contrasted with one another with the higher coefficient 
signifying that they are strongly affected of the independent variables on the dependent 
variable. Regression coefficient disclosed that the variables were predictors of the model's 
dependent variable. 
Generally, the results in Table 5.8 displayed three variables in the study that were discovered 
to be significant with firm capital structure predictors (measured by DBTAST). The variables 
are firm size (FSIZE) (β= 0.024611, p<0.01), firm tangibility (TANG) (β= 0.273070, 
p<0.01), firm liquidity (LIQ) (β= -0.010110, p<0.01). Other variables such as number of 
female directors (PWOM) (β=0.216059, p>0.01), female directors expertise (PEXP) (β= -
0.347376, p>0.01), independent female directors (PINDP) (β= 0.002060, p>0.01), board size 
(BSIZE) (β= 0.003589, p>0.01), board composition (BCOMP) (β= 0.076781, p>0.01), firm 
age (FAGE) (β= 0.001048, p>0.01), and firm investment opportunities (MKBV) (β= -
0.002845, p>0.01), failed to make a significant contribution as dependent variable predictors 
(firm capital structure assessed by using debt to asset ratio). 
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Other than that, the results in Table 5.9 for further studies displayed only two variables in the 
study that were discovered to be significant with firm capital structure predictors (measured 
by DBTEQY). The variables are firm tangibility (TANG) (β= 0.890091, p<0.01), firm 
liquidity (LIQ) (β= -0.019777, p<0.01). Other variables such as number of female directors 
(PWOM) (β=0.380541, p>0.01), female directors expertise (PEXP) (β= -0.037869, p>0.01), 
independent female directors (PINDP) (β= -0.616548, p>0.01), firm size (FSIZE) (β= 
0.027112, p>0.01), board size (BSIZE) (β= 0.008081, p>0.01), board composition (BCOMP) 
(β= 0.073653, p>0.01), firm age (FAGE) (β= 0.000597, p>0.01), and firm investment 
opportunities (MKBV) (β= 0.000670, p>0.01), failed to make a significant contribution as 
dependent variable predictors (firm capital structure measured by using debt to equity ratio). 
5.8.2 Hypotheses Testing 
In this section, it discusses the analysis results about the correlation between capital structure 
and independent variables. Debt to assets ratio as dependent variable and number of female 
directors, female director’s expertise, and independent female directors  are the hypotheses 
variables. Whereas the control variables are the firm size, board size, board composition, firm 
age, firm tangibility, firm liquidity and firm investment opportunities are presented through 
data analysis. In addition, presents the results of farther test for the correlation between 
number of female directors, female director’s expertise, and independent female directors  
and the capital structure (debt to equity ratio) which to investigate the robustness of the result. 
5.8.2.1 Number of Female Directors and Debt to Assets Ratio 
Based on Table 5.8, number of female directors has insignificant and positive relationship 
with debt to assets ratio. The result shows that the higher the number of female directors, the 
higher is the firm leverage. The possible explanations behind the relationship are because 
number of women still low between the top 100 companies in Malaysia as found in this study 
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approximately 16% of women sits on board of directors. Thus, their contributions considered 
minority towards firm financing decision compared to overall board members decision.  
The findings is inconsistent with study hypothesis, and support Ahern & Dittmar (2012) 
where larger number of women in board will impact man decision towards financial impact. 
Women participation on board of director found give an impact on board of director 
effectiveness in decision making and monitoring (Rovers, 2013; and Adams & Ferreira, 
2009). 
Table 5.9 presents the results of the correlation between number of female directors and firm 
debt to equity ratio (DEBTEQY) which is to investigate the robustness of the result. The 
relationship between number of female directors and firm debt to equity ratio (DEBTEQY) 
was found to be statistically insignificant and positive. Results from the two tested are robust, 
thus study suggests that number of women influence capital structure decision positively yet 
insignificant. 
5.8.2.2 Female Directors Expertise and Debt to Assets Ratio 
Based on Table 5.8, female directors expertise found insignificant and negative relationship 
to debt to assets ratio. The negative relationship with firms leverage indicates that the higher 
the female director expertise the lower is the firms leverage. The possible reason for the 
negative relationship between female director expertise and debt to assets ratio is because  
female that have financial expertise tend to react towards risk averse decision, which results 
manipulates the other majority member board of directors to decrease the firms leverage.  
Thus, the findings are not consistent with study hypotheses where women with financial 
background involvement on Malaysia top 100 public listed companies tend to react 
negatively toward firm capital structure and insignificant. Ruigrok, Peck, & Tacheva (2007) 
found that women director who are involved in financial or an accounting function tend to be 
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elected as executive position compared to those who not in that field rarely selected. In 
Malaysia environment women can be classified as high priority towards financial background 
as condition to be a member board of director due to difference on their educational 
background and business environment. 
Moreover, Table 5.9 presents the results of the relationship between female director’s 
expertise and debt to equity ratio (DBTEQY) which is to investigate the robustness of the 
result. The result shows that there is statistically insignificant and negative same as previous 
model result. This suggests that female directors expertise influence negatively insignificant 
the firms leverage. 
5.8.2.3 Independent Female Director and Debt to Assets Ratio 
Based on Table 5.8, the third hypotheses variable, an independent female director is found 
insignificant and positive correlation with debt to assets ratio. The plausible reason for the 
positively insignificant relationship between independent female directors and debt to assets 
ratio is because of lower number involvement for independent women directors which brings 
higher firms leverage.  
This finding is inconsistent with study hypotheses. Independent female directors positively 
impact firms leverage. Thus, it resulted in the number female that have independent position 
will impact the firms leverage decision. Even though, independent women director cannot 
influence the majority of the board, the other non-executive directors may influence the board 
decision towards firm capital structure due to their more strict to serve the company. This can 
be supported by previous study that non-executive directors more stricly perform their duties 
(Weisbach, 1988).  
Apart from that, Table 5.9 shows the findings of the correlation between independent female 
directors and debt to equity ratio (DBTEQY) which is to investigate the robustness of the 
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result. The findings found that, statistically insignificant and negative correlation which is 
different from previous model result. Thus, this may cause of risk averse personality of 
female directors, which they tend to react reversely toward high risk matters likely to focus 
on the study finance decision making. This suggests that independent female director’s 
influence positively to the firm debt to assets ratio and influence negatively to the firm’s debt 
to equity ratio. 
5.8.2.4 Control Variables and Debt to Assets Ratio 
Seven control variables were included in this study, which are firm size, board size, board 
composition, firm age, tangibility, liquidity, and investment opportunities. First is firm size 
one of variable that may influence the firm’s capital structure. Then, this study found positive 
significant result between firm size and debt to assets ratio based on Table 5.8. Firm size and 
debt to assets ratio is significant at level 0.1. This positive relations results also found by 
previous researcher studies (see Fraser, Zhang, & Derashid, 2006; Bliss & Gul, 2012; 
Koyuncu et al., 2010; and Zhang, 2008). Other than that, further studies in the Table 5.9 
shows same result of positive relationship but insignificant. The possible explanations of 
insignificant results happen due to the larger firms tend to borrow more because they can 
borrow at more favourable interest rate to finance its assets. Thus, this result shows 
relationship of firm size with debt to assets ratio stronger compared to the equity to assets 
ratio. 
Second control variable is board size, which measured by total of board of directors sits on 
the year tested.  Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 shows that there positive insignificant correlation 
between board size and capital structure. This finding shows, every increasing in board size it 
is increase debt to assets ratio and debt to equity ratio. Despite with that Berger et al. (1998) 
found that, there are negative  correlation between the board size and firm capital structure. 
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This assume that the other factor may impact the relationship, such as business environment 
and financial structure of the business tested. 
Third is board composition, the results presented in Table 5.8 found a positive and 
insignificant correlation with debt to assets ratio. In addition, Table 5.9 also found positive 
insignificantly relationship with debt to equity ratio. The findings are inconsistent with the 
previous studies (Wen et al., 2002; Wang & Deng, 2006; and Lawler & Conger, 2009) which 
showed that an increase in board composition provides more extreme discussion between 
board of directors and result to an increase on firm’s capital structure. These positive 
relationships are consistent with Abor (2007) findings. Therefore, board composition increase 
firms leverage. 
Fourth control variable is firm age, the results presented in Table 5.8 shows a positive 
insignificant relationship with firm’s capital structure. The results are inconsistent with the 
previous studies (Ahmed et al., 2010; Driffield et al., 2007; and Gregory et al., 2005) which 
one unit increase in firm age shows increase firm leverage by 0.10. Meanwhile, Table 5.9 
shows same result which a positive insignificant relationship between firms age with firm’s 
capital structure. This positive relationship is due to the equity structure of the firms that 
brings positive effect to the father test result. 
Fifth control variable is tangibility, which measure by the ratio of non-current assets to total 
assets. Based on Table 5.8, this study found positive with significant results between 
tangibility and capital structure measure by debt to assets ratio and debt to equity ratio. The 
results are consistent with the previous studies (Fraser, Zhang, & Derashid, 2006; and Bliss & 
Gul, 2012) showed that an increase in firm tangibility brings company tend to finance its 
asssets through and increase of firms leverage. 
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Sixth control variable is liquidity, the results presented in Table 5.8 and Table 5.9 shows a 
negative and significant relationship with capital structure. The findings are consistent with 
the previous studies (Wahab & Ramli, 2014; Hussain & Miras, 2015; and Jamal et al., 2013). 
An increasing in the liquidity of a company accompanies an increase in board of director’s 
abilities and skills to decrease firm leverage. Therefore, firms leverage decreases with the 
firm liquidity. 
Finally, seventh control variable was considered in this study is investment opportunities 
which measured by the ratio of price per share to book value equity per share (MKBV). Table 
5.8 displays a negative relationship and insignificantly with firm capital structure. These 
findings are inconsistent with the previous studies (Fraser, Zhang, & Derashid, 2006). Other 
than that, further study Table 5.9 displays a positive relationship and insignificantly related to 
capital structure. The positive insignificant findings are consistent with the previous studies 
(Bliss & Gul, 2012). Any increase of firms investment opportunities will increase firm 
leverage by 0.06 as shown on Table 5.9. 
5.9 Summary of the Chapter 
This chapter has discussed as well as provided detail discussions on the results as per the 
objectives of the study. This chapter carries out the diagnostic tests, and linear regression 
analysis. Also, further test was lined out. Finally, discussions of the results. Thus, the 
following chapter is conclusions, limitations and recommendations for future studies. 




CONCLUSIONS, LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE STUDIES 
 
6.1 Introduction 
This current study has examined the relationship between some specific set of female 
directors variables such as number of female directors, female directors expertise, and 
independent female director representing the independent variables, firm size, board size, 
board composition, firm age, tangibility, liquidity and investment opportunities, representing 
the control variables and measure of firm capital structure (debt to assets ratio), representing 
the dependent variable, for year ended 2016 annual reports of top 100 Malaysian companies 
listed on the Bursar Malaysia based on market capitalization. This chapter provides the 
introduction of the chapter. Meanwhile, the second section is the research summary, and then 
next the limitation of the study. Finally, it presents the recommendations for future studies, 
the contribution of the study, and as well as the conclusion. 
6.2 Research Summary 
The study investigates top 100 Malaysian public listed companies that are listed in the Bursar 
Malaysia for the one year time frame of 2016. The main focus of this study is to investigate 
the effect of female directors towards firm’s capital structure. For the purpose of this 
research, female director variables are to be represented by number of female directors, 
female director’s expertise, and independent female directors to determine their influence 
towards the firm’s capital structure. In view of the results obtained, this study found that the 
relationship between number of female directors and capital structure is positively 
insignificant. This finding indicates that the higher the number of women, the higher their 
influence toward firm capital structure for these periods under review. 
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Besides that, female director’s expertise has negative insignificant relationship with firm’s 
capital structure. This shows that female director’s expertise risks aversely influencing firm’s 
capital structure in these periods under review. In addition, independent female directors have 
positive and insignificant correlation with firm’s capital structure. This positive relationship 
assume due to lower number of independent female directors involved as board of director 
position. The presence of female on board of directors in Malaysian public listed companies 
is considered small compared to the bigger countries such as the U.S and UK. 
All of three independent variables show insignificant relationship with capital structure and 
the results different from the U.S and UK studies. The main reason is due to difference in the 
economical statue, which is developed countries (U.S and UK) and developing countries 
(Malaysia). Besides, governance and regulatory system of developed countries is highly 
regulated and have higher compliance level compared to developing countries. Other than 
that, a perfect expression of a society, which is a culture also influences the insignificant 
results. It is because, developed and developing countries distinct in terms of their spiritual, 
material, intellectual and emotional characteristics. 
Furthermore, seven control variables which include: firm size, board size, board composition, 
firm age, tangibility, liquidity and investment opportunities were investigated. Firm size and 
tangibility has positive significant relationships towards firm’s capital structure. Then, 
liquidity has negative and significant affect towards firm’s capital structure. Meantime, board 
size, board composition, firm age has positive insignificant effect towards firm’s capital 
structure. In additions, investment opportunities have negative insignificant influence towards 
firm’s capital structure. 
Apart from that this study carried out further test by using debt to equity ratio as capital 
structure proxies. The results on the relationship are the same with previous model result 
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except for independent female directors and investment opportunities. Independent female 
directors found negatively and insignificant affect the firm debt to equity ratio and investment 
opportunities show positive and insignificant relationship towards firm’s capital structure. 
Besides that, there are two significant results for tangibility and liquidity with negative and 
positive significant, respectively. 
Table 6.1 
Summary of the Hypothesis Testing Results 
Hypothesis Hypothesis statement Findings 
Support/ Do Not 
Support Hyphotesis 
H1  There is a significant and negative 
relationship between number of 




Do Not Support 
H2  There is a significant and negative 
relationship between female directors 
expertise and capital structure.  
 
Insignificant 
& Negative  
Do Not Support 
H3  There is a significant and negative 
relationship between independent 
female directors and capital structure.  
Insignificant 
& Positive  
Do Not Support 
 
In conclusion, the study results obtained from data analyses showed that two hypotheses were 
insignificant and positive relationship while the other one is insignificant and negative 
relationship. Specifically, Table 6.1 indicates that H1 is insignificant and positive and H2 is 
insignificant and negative. On the other hand, H3 is insignificant and positive. According to 
the finding in Table 5.8, the objectives of the study are achieved as shown in Table 6.1. 
6.3 Limitations of the Study 
There are few studies on board diversity and capital structure in the Malaysian companies. 
Most of the empirical studies referenced in this study were studies conducted in developed 
countries. However, due to the differences in environment and culture between these 
countries, the results of these studies might not be appropriate and suitable to be applied in 
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the Malaysian setting. A portion of the information utilized as a part of this investigation was 
gathered from DataStream. Even though the DataStream was a source of data collection, it 
still provides missing data of some certain Malaysian public listed companies. Apart from 
that, this study used top 100 Malaysian public listed companies for one year period and does 
not covers all industry for Malaysian especially financial institutions. Thus the result may 
vary if it is using big samples of data and with longer period of time. 
6.4 Suggestions for Future Research 
Future research on female directors may be carried out for different measurement of female 
directors proxies, such as using dummy variable or other possible proxies. Other than that, 
further research may be carried out from more time range of period in order to provide a 
more robust result of the relationship between female directors and capital structure of 
developing countries. 
Furthermore, the data utilized for the present study is originated from top 100 Malaysian 
companies with their debt to assets and debt to equity ratio. A larger year of data set relating 
financial might convey a substitute model of the relationship that exists between female 
directors and capital structure. 
6.5 Implications 
6.5.1 Body of Knowledge 
The results of this study are important to other researchers. It is useful because of its 
contribution to body of knowledge specifically on the relationship between female directors 
and capital structure. Also this will be useful to future researchers who are interested in 
conducting the same type of research like this field of study. This study also contributes an 
evidence of the insignificant relationship between number of female directors, female director 
expertise and independent female directors with capital structure of Malaysian companies. 
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6.5.2 Policy 
The result of this study is important to policymakers because it will facilitate the formulation 
of policies regarding female directors involvement. In the year of 2017, Malaysian MCCG 
had outlines at least 30% women involvement. Therefore, this study is important as a 
benchmark to regulators and policymakers in Malaysia to ensure companies follow the 
guidelines and prevent possible threat of reluctances. 
Furthermore, this study can contribute current information and opportunities especially to the 
policymakers. According to the finding of this study, policymakers can strengthen the rules 
and regulations to improve the compliance of Malaysian PLC’s from time to time and to 
ensure it is in line with the current MCCG. It will also provide a valuable information to help 
companies aware of female director involvement to influence the board decision effectively 
and efficiently. 
6.5.3 Practical Implications 
It is important for practitioners to prove the factors that affect capital structure, and enable 
them to improve their board of director practice. Malaysian companies need to be aware on 
the demand of female director involvement in board positions. If they are reluctant to move 
forward, it will somehow give a huge impact to their compliance toward Malaysian 
regulations as well as giving impact in the ineffectiveness of board director in decision 
making. 
Besides, it also provides valuable information as well as guidance for Malaysian companies 
to improve their current position and to be compatible with current environment regulations. 
The influence of female directors will give positive impact to the Malaysian companies as 
overall. Therefore, the study serves as an input to companies in Malaysia. In addition, this 
type of research provides better understanding and valuable information to the firms in order 
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to become more competitive and acceptable by relevant parties such as investors and 
creditors. 
Furthermore, this study also gives benefits to the investors and depositors as well as creditors. 
The study serves as an input to depositors and investors alike in terms of making decision to 
act. For instance, a good and efficient board of director’s management will attract investors as 
they normally like to do their investments with reliable risk that have good and efficient 
influence of female directors. Investors and creditors usually look at the firm effectiveness 
such as female directors found to influence firms capital structure as well as has risk averse 
personality. 
6.6 Conclusions 
The aim of this study is to investigate the effect of female directors on the capital structure of 
top 100 Malaysian companies; the objectives of this study have been accomplished. The 
study investigates the relationship between the hypotheses variables namely number of 
female directors, female director expertise, and independent female directors with the 
dependent variable namely debt to asset ratio (DBTAST). Based on the results of the data 
analysis, only three variable namely firm sizes, tangibility, and liquidity was found to be 
significant relationship with the capital structure which was measured using debt to assets 
ratio (DBTAST). Also, further study found only two significant variables between tangibility 
and liquidity with debt to equity ratio (DBTEQY). 
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